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Hospitality and Maternal Consent 
Abstract 
'Law is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is 
incalculable, it demands that one calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the 
experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the 
decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule' (Derrida 2010: 244). There is a growing 
literature outlining deep concerns that a woman’s basic right to give informed consent and, consequently, 
the capacity to determine what happens to her body, that is, herself, in the course of her own medical 
care, is being compromised. Covering a range of jurisdictions, but in particular reflecting on the US 
situation, concerns range from a perceived extortion of consent from uninformed and often unwilling 
women (Baker 2009-2010), to accusations of the perpetuation of violence against women by the obstetric 
profession as a whole (Charles 2011), and, in some cases, obstetricians and hospitals are choosing to 
request court orders to perform medical interventions that override an autonomous women’s informed 
consent on the basis of a growing conception of ‘foetal rights’. These moral rights are situated as being in 
perceived conflict with a woman’s legal right to decide what happens to her body and, increasingly, there 
is medical and political pressure being bought to bear upon the law to attend to this moral dilemma in a 
range of cases. 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol17/iss1/12 
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Law is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that 
there be law, but justice is incalculable, it demands that one calculate 
with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as 
improbable as they are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments 
in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a 
rule (Derrida 2010: 244). 
There is a growing literature outlining deep concerns that a woman’s 
basic right to give informed consent and, consequently, the capacity 
to determine what happens to her body, that is, herself, in the course 
of her own medical care, is being compromised. Covering a range of 
jurisdictions, but in particular reflecting on the US situation, concerns 
range from a perceived extortion of consent from uninformed and 
often unwilling women (Baker 2009-2010), to accusations of the 
perpetuation of violence against women by the obstetric profession as 
a whole (Charles 2011), and, in some cases, obstetricians and hospitals 
are choosing to request court orders to perform medical interventions 
that override an autonomous women’s informed consent on the basis of 
a growing conception of ‘foetal rights’. These moral rights are situated 
as being in perceived conflict with a woman’s legal right to decide what 
happens to her body and, increasingly, there is medical and political 
pressure being bought to bear upon the law to attend to this moral 
dilemma in a range of cases. 
In this article we will approach the issue of conflicting legal 
maternal rights and foetal moral rights through Jacque Derrida’s 
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conception of hospitality as a way of opening up discussion of what is at 
stake, ethically, when force is used, in the form of legal interventions to 
do with pregnant women’s choices. While there is seemingly some sort 
of a continuum between what is ethical and what is legal, for Derrida, 
the two areas compete for recognition, and can thus interfere with the 
instantiation of the other. As such, this framework is particularly apt to 
this ethical dilemma as it is currently unfolding in multiple jurisdictions 
albeit at differing levels of substantiation.
Hospitality for Derrida is a negotiation that, while being defined 
by an unconditional welcome to the guest who enters, must become 
conditional in order to function. That is, the welcome offered to the 
guest must be limited by the conditions that govern how the guest will 
‘properly’ use the house in order to be welcome. For Derrida, ethics 
is the capacity to unconditionally welcome or to remain open to the 
guest in such a way as to allow the guest to be himself, comfortable 
within his particularity and his particular quirks, while experiencing 
as the host, a sense of strangeness that does not attempt to reduce or 
limit or eroticise the unfamiliar, what is foreign about this guest. To 
be in a relationship of ethical hospitality is thus to be in a relationship 
of ethical proximity with this strangeness which, put simply, is respect 
for a particular and personal embodied experience. 
Negotiating the practical conditions for an ethical and yet 
functioning hospitality must lead to a bounded ‘indeterminacy’ in the 
practice of the ethics of hospitality because an ethical host cannot, due 
to the strangeness of the guest, ever be sure what conditions or limits 
placed upon their behaviour will be most harmful . There should always 
be a tension which, Derrida claims, limits intervention; it is this held 
indeterminacy that actually defines the site of responsible decision in 
legal interventions and constructions of rights. Ethics thus occurs at 
the intersection between the conditional and unconditional aspects of 
hospitality and is defined by the conditions or what Derrida calls the 
proximity given to the Otherness of the guest. Within this framework 
of hospitality what we articulate in this article is the manner in which, 
for the institutions of the law, and perhaps even more so for medicine, 
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increasingly this ethical proximity and respect for a particular and 
personal embodied experience is being denied pregnant woman. At 
the same time, there is an increasing proximity to the foetus that draws 
attention, consideration and ethical negotiation.
This denial of proximity in relation to the pregnant woman, we 
argue, is primarily the result of a growing technological approach to 
medical intervention which conceives the woman as holding within her 
body an Other body which needs medical and, at times, legal hospitality. 
The focus of legal discourse in response to this evolution has been to give 
increasingly greater moral and legal weight to the value of the foetus to 
society and, consequently, to the pregnant woman herself. However, 
conceptualizing foetal Otherness as foetal rights not only gives rise to 
the situation of competing rights, but also locates the site of ethical 
play and determination within the body of the pregnant woman. Thus, 
viewing cases through the structures of hospitality we can see how and 
why pregnancy draws public social commentary, interest, and ultimately 
moral judgements that construct the pregnant body as public space and 
a site of legitimate intervention. 
Through a process of deconstruction, the lens of hospitality can 
reveal the territory that must be carefully negotiated in cases of medical 
and legal intervention. On the one hand any ethical limitation on 
intervention would allow the threat of violence to decide who will be 
welcomed and, more importantly, who will be excluded from seeking 
hospitality. On the other hand, a boundless intervention would erase the 
threshold between unconditional and conditional hospitality on which 
the ethics of hospitality are premised. Such an argument necessarily 
examines the practice of intervention as it relates to specific medical 
and legal cases of hospitality rather than the ethics of hospitality to 
medical and legal intervention as a practice.  
The overall thesis presented in this article is that ethical decision-
making in regards to the validity of pregnant women’s choices must 
recognise that responsive and responsible decision-making must 
remain welcoming of the woman’s moral voice. In specific cases of legal 
intervention that overrules a woman’s refusal to consent to a medical 
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procedure, the findings are usually arrived at through a reduction of the 
circumstances to a standpoint of universality. That is, a legal conception 
of personhood is a universal theory of what it is to be an individual 
within a social order, underpinning notions of rights, autonomy and 
duty, which are in turn applied to all legal persons. Yet for Derrida 
there is an inherent violence that is perpetrated upon the individual 
whenever universals are enforced, even the most honourable among 
them, such as human or moral rights. This is because in reducing the 
Other to the same, we deny each person their unique and irreplaceable 
life and experience. 
The reduction of pregnant embodiment to a conception of embodied 
universality, which can be framed as a ‘right’, or to a generalised 
condition that is ‘pregnancy’ as an absolute condition, reduces the 
complexity and proximity of the ethical situation as experienced by a 
pregnant woman.  From the perspective of hospitality we see the ethical 
challenge is how to respond to the unique Otherness of pregnancy 
without reducing this particularity to sameness through legislation 
or an application of ‘rights’ that is the universal par excellence. Such a 
reduction evades the tension and undecidability inherent in ethical 
decision making and acts to silence the particularity of pregnant 
women’s lives. As Shildrick identifies, ‘To bring the irreducible other 
under the remit of law is always to effect a certain reductive violence 
against her difference’ (Shildrick 2005: 41).  
Exploring how and why the maternal-foetal relation has been 
constructed as adversarial and dissociative to the degree that it can 
frame denial of a woman’s autonomy as benevolent (and thus ethical) 
suggests that this is only possible because of a way of thinking that is 
underpinned by conceptions of what is acceptable through a hospitality 
that is conditional.   
1 Hospitality
For Derrida there is no culture or social bond that operates outside 
the principle of hospitality although what is considered ethical across 
cultures may differ. Derrida states that 
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Insofar as it has to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one’s home, 
the familiar place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, 
the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others 
as our own or as foreigners, ethics is hospitality’ (Derrida 2001: 16). 
Within a culture where respect for the individual as individuated 
is paramount, as it is within the cultures that we will speak about 
in this article, an ethical hospitality is one that most preserves the 
individual choice and freedoms of all the concerned participants; in 
other words, their subjectivity, their singularity. An ethical hospitality 
that holds this aim in mind, for Derrida, concerns itself with the 
capacity to approximate an unconditional welcome, as far as possible, 
of an unknown stranger. 
In order to approximate an unconditional welcome that preserves 
the singularity of the persons involved, one must negotiate two 
hospitalities: an unconditional and unlimited hospitality and a 
conditional  hospitality most often understood as rights and obligations, 
especially as they are set out in the law. Such a negotiation Derrida 
describes as ‘a formidable challenge because if these two hospitalities 
do not contradict each other, they remain heterogeneous at the very 
moment that they appeal to each other, in a disconcerting way’ 
(Derrida 2005: 6). In order to preserve the subjectivity and freedom of 
the foreigner one must welcome them unconditionally. To welcome a 
complete stranger unconditionally would mean opening our home and 
giving over our place in welcome to whoever arrived with no restriction 
upon their behaviour or attitude. Pure hospitality ‘consists in welcoming 
whoever arrives before imposing any conditions on him, before knowing 
and asking anything at all, be it a name or an identity “paper”’ (Derrida 
2005: 7). To welcome unconditionally would thus mean that sooner or 
later, as the strangers continued to arrive, I would surely lose my position 
as host and possibly even my home.  To undertake such a venture would 
therefore be impossible and, so, as Derrida (2005: 6) explains, in order 
for hospitality to function practically there must be thresholds in place; 
there must be conditions or rules that outline the ‘proper’ use of the 
home and the home must remain the property of the host, with all 
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that this implies. Thus for Derrida, although the essence of a hospitable 
relation demands that I welcome strangers without limit, reserve and 
without calculation, I must also and in order ‘to render this welcome 
effective, determined, concrete’ impose conditions upon these strangers 
and in doing so ‘transform the gift into a contract’ and the stranger into 
a guest through the regulation of their behaviour (Derrida 2005: 6). 
The conditions of hospitality offered by the host must, in the 
name of unconditional hospitality, be carefully calculated because each 
one comes at a cost to this stranger’s singularity. For Derrida, each 
condition violates the individuality, the freedom, of the guest because 
it must by its nature involve mastery, control, and appropriation. It is 
also, however, through the conditions of hospitality that the stranger 
is made known through assimilation, as the conditions enshrined by 
the host will, by necessity, reduce the foreignness of the stranger to 
the familial domesticity that is deemed proper. Thus, it follows that 
the more severe the conditions of hospitality, the greater the reduction 
of the Other into a sameness that denies the guest their unique and 
irreplaceable life and experience. 
This erasure of subjectivity is the violence that Derrida identifies 
as inherent within the structure of hospitality and as such why the 
principle of hospitality, if it is to seek justice, must always address 
itself to singularity. Claims that universalise human experience are 
the realm of conditional hospitality and although they may aim at the 
substantiation of a humanitarian norm, will nonetheless perpetuate 
violence should they be forcefully upheld in each and every instance. 
So for Derrida the task is to ‘try to determine the best conditions, that 
is to say some particular legislative limits, and especially a particular 
application of the laws’ (Derrida 2005: 7); the difficulty being in 
how to sustain a welcome that is respectful to the individuality, the 
foreignness, of the guest.
Derrida calls the required negotiation between conditional and 
unconditional hospitality the ‘double law’ of hospitality; it is through 
their dialectical engagement that a ‘site of strategy and decision’ is 
generated as a possibility for responsible decision-making (Derrida 
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2005: 7). Derrida argues, if one merely accepts one into their hospitality 
as a duty, or as a pre-prepared expectation that does not displace or 
disrupt, then no real welcome has been extended and there is no 
hospitality. It is an act performed ‘unwillingly, against my natural 
inclination, and therefore without smiling’ (Derrida 2010: 361). 
This reveals a contradiction at the heart of hospitality: through the 
anticipation of welcoming, and built into the culture of hospitality and 
its instituted structures of welcoming, we might no longer perform a 
welcome. Therefore, in the case of legal judgements, a decision, if it is 
to be called just, must comprise a ‘reinstituting act of interpretation, as 
if ultimately nothing existed of the law, as if the judge himself invented 
the law in every case. No exercise of the law can be just unless there 
is a ‘fresh judgement’ (Derrida 1990: 963). In practicality what this 
means is that in order for a judgement to be ethical it needs to sustain 
as paramount the singularity, the Otherness of the foreigner, and so 
must be a particular decision that will be relative to each case. 
2 Pregnant Embodiment and the Law
On the face of it, a pregnant woman’s right to self-determination is 
firmly entrenched in and protected by the common law in Australia, 
the UK and the US. Within the medical setting, self-determination is 
upheld through the doctrine of informed consent. Informed consent 
requires a patient to not only consent to medical treatment freely but 
that she be given a sufficient amount of knowledge of the risks, benefits 
and possible burdens of undertaking any procedure. The situation of 
pregnant embodiment does not alter a woman’s right to consent. Any 
medical treatment that is considered ‘invasive’ to the person must 
have the consent of that person – this is a legally binding duty within 
the professional practice of doctors and other medical staff. The right 
to refuse medical treatment logically follows such a principle. The 
right to refuse treatment is expressed in Rogers v Whitaker, endorsing 
a previously expressed principle recognising a person’s autonomy 
(Thampapillai 2005: 455).  
In the United States, Canada and Great Britain, early case law 
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supported what were purported to be the interests of the foetus and, 
consequently, often resulted in court ordered obstetrical intervention. 
However, the early cluster of judicial determinations that supported 
intervention and foetal rights in the US and Great Britain have been 
reversed and autonomy and thus consent has been clearly identified 
as the over-riding legal principle (Werren 2007: 267; 270). In current 
research by Matevosyan (2012; 2013) exploring whether there is or 
has been a predominant focus or trend in hearings focused on forced 
obstetrical intervention, she identifies that of 37 hearings across the 
US, Canada and Great Britain (with 83.8% or 31 of these cases being in 
the US), 18 cases concerned maternal-foetal conflicts.  Of the 18 cases 
regarding maternal-foetal conflict, maternal autonomy was preserved 
in 7 (38.9%) (Matevosyan 2013: 514). The research found that where 
interventions were upheld, maternal autonomy was impaired and 
consent was not judged to be that of a competent adult, thus supporting 
previous research identifying that, in cases where coercive policies were 
upheld, these cases concerned ‘the most vulnerable women, including 
those with mental illnesses, poor economical and social support’ 
(Matevosyan 2013: 510).1
Matevosyan includes the case of Re AC (both its initial judgement 
and its reversal) in the 18 cases identified, emphasizing in her brief 
description the recognition articulated in the reversal, that a Court 
must determine the woman’s wishes and protect maternal rights ‘by 
any means available’ (Matevosyan 2013: 517). In the case of Re AC, a 
young woman named Angela Carder, pregnant but dying from cancer, 
was ordered by a district court to undergo a caesarean against her 
express wish. The 1987 judgement was vacated in 1990 in the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeal after the death of the defendant, who, 
along with her foetus, died post-operatively; the caesarean section 
being identified as a contributing factor in Carder’s death. The earlier 
decision was described as a violation of Carder’s rights to informed 
consent and the bodily integrity inherent in this right. Thus, Re AC has 
become central to the development of law around maternal autonomy 
and consent vs foetal rights. In the US, where case law had supported 
forced intervention in the interests of the foetus, the judgement to 
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vacate this order firmly re-established a pregnant woman’s autonomy. 
This case remains significant to the law, despite it now being over 25 
years in the past. Its significance however belongs to a longer historical 
chain of events whereby the foetus has come into being as having 
interests deemed ethical to support, with this position increasingly 
creating debate over whether foetal interests should be protected by law. 
While intervention in a woman’s pregnancy has generally been seen to 
be within the doctor’s purview (Featherstone 2008: 454-455), at the 
particular time and place of the Re AC rulings, the issue of protecting 
an individual’s autonomy was on the rise, and vigorously pursued by 
feminist activists and scholars as well as foetal rights activists.
The overriding ethical and legal position from this case is that ‘the 
pregnant woman is deemed morally responsible to attempt to preserve 
foetal health and rights, however, she is not legally compelled to accept 
medical treatment for her foetus’ (Matevosyan 2013: 510). Matevosyan’s 
review highlights the way that some court orders have made errors in 
making a legal judgement in supporting obstetric intervention. While 
such cases are often overturned, and importantly so, as in the Re AC 
case, judgements have still been made that impact the woman’s right to 
self-determination and it is these cases that reflect not only contested 
views on foetal identity and foetal rights, but the use of the public sphere 
of the law to argue issues regarding the legal status of the foetus. It 
remains that while the foetus may be perceived to have a right to life, 
practitioner actions that take this perceived right, held to be in conflict 
with a woman’s fundamental autonomy, and often resulting in the case 
being heard in court, are, Burrows claims, ‘basically an illegal concern 
with the right of the foetus to life’ (Burrows 2001: 690). 
Burrows also identifies Re MB, where a woman with a needle phobia 
refused an emergency caesarean, as confirming the born alive rule; that 
is, a court cannot take the purported interests and purported rights 
of the foetus into consideration until it is born alive (Burrows 2001: 
691). Kristen Savell notes that ‘for the purposes of the criminal law, the 
born alive rule has been traced to Coke who defined the common law 
offence of murder by reference to the killing of a ‘reasonable creature in 
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rerum natura’ (Savell 2006a: 627). While the born alive rule has been 
confirmed in a number of cases, the courts acknowledge that while the 
legal position is determined, the ethical dilemma of foetal ‘interests’ 
clearly remains. This ethical dilemma is exemplified in the UK case 
of Re S, where a mother who had refused to consent to a caesarean 
section on religious grounds had her refusal overruled; the baby was 
stillborn. While overruled in the Court of Appeal, with the decision 
being subsequently described as ‘logically untenable’ (Mason et al 1999 
in Meredith 2005: 266), such cases as this clearly express the power of 
the ethical dilemma.
That there is no legal protection of the foetus, remains a situation 
of particular concern in cases where deliberate actions, or actions 
incidental to criminal activity, cause the death of the foetus in utero. 
Some states in the US have discarded the born-alive rule in favour 
of establishing a legal identity for the foetus primarily in response to 
these types of situations. With regard to feticide laws, in the US and 
as at 2005, Sheena Meredith (2005: 14) identifies that 31 states have 
enacted foetal homicide laws and/or other legislation that identifies 
the foetus as having a value worthy of state protection. Under these 
legislations it has been estimated that by 1992 around 50 cases of court 
ordered caesarean sections had been performed against the mother’s 
wishes (Seymour 1994b: 77). The most extensive legislation to date is 
the Unborn Victims of Violence Act (UVVA) that came into effect in the 
US in 2004. The UVVA 2004 specifically grants the foetus legal rights 
in the event of being harmed as a consequence of a crime committed 
under federal or US military jurisdiction. This legislation describes the 
victim as a ‘child in utero’ who is defined as a member of the species 
Homo sapiens, at any stage of development. 
In Australia, NSW currently does not have legislation making the 
deliberate or incidental killing of a foetus due to a criminal human act 
(‘foetal homicide’ or ‘child destruction’) illegal, standing out as the only 
Australian state in this regard. However, the case of R v King (hereafter 
King) was significant in its impact on law relating to grievous bodily 
harm to the foetus. In King, a woman who had refused an abortion 
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following an unplanned pregnancy was subsequently violently attacked 
by the biological father, resulting in the foetus being stillborn at 24 
weeks. In the Criminal Court of Appeal the judge ruled that this violent 
act constituted grievous bodily harm to the mother. Thus, the Crimes 
Amendment (Grievous Bodily Harm) Act 2005 (NSW) was formulated 
in response to King in order to recognise that the infliction of grievous 
bodily harm extended to the destruction of the foetus, ‘other than in 
the course of a medical procedure, whether or not the mother suffers 
any other harm’ (Uppal et al 2012: 182). This allowed for recognition 
of the gravity of such offences, distinguished criminal acts from third 
parties resulting in foetal death from therapeutic terminations of 
pregnancy, and avoided ‘the common law question of a “creature in 
being” to which harm can be done’ (Uppal et al 2012: 182). However, 
it must be noted that cases of third party harm appear to be cases 
where law needs to make a determination if justice is to occur in the 
form of either compensation, should the action be deemed negligent, 
or a sentence to the third party should the action be deemed criminal. 
These do not protect the foetus as much as provide justice after the fact. 
However, this sense of protection of the foetus is potentially 
conflated and the possibilities of such conflation add to fears of a 
slippery slope effect whereby such recognition of the foetus has the 
potential to disrupt the legal position around maternal consent. In 
reviewing the current legal situation in NSW, Uppal et al (2012: 183), 
for example, advocate for full legal recognition of the foetus in NSW 
law. They also claim that the law in NSW does not ‘match community 
expectations’ or the need to recognize maternal loss in cases where 
third party assaults or accidents result in foetal loss (Uppal et al 2012: 
183). In an attempt to address such concerns, there currently exists in 
NSW a Private Member’s Bill: the Crimes Amendment (Zoe’s Law) Bill 
2013 (NSW), introduced by Liberal MP Chris Spence on 29 August 
2013. At the time of writing the Bill had just been passed the NSW 
Legislative Assembly (on the 21st November 2013), by 63 votes to 26, 
despite opposition by the New South Wales Bar Association and the 
Australian Medical Association. The impact of this Bill, if passed as 
legislation, is to have grievous bodily harm to the foetus recognised in 
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law by conferring personhood on the foetus. The cases contributing 
to the conceptualization for the need for these legislations and for 
the introduction of such a Bill in Australia have not involved the 
consideration of the pregnant woman’s consent or refusal of consent 
to actions that affect her body and her life. Rather, these are cases 
where the trauma undergone is the result of circumstances beyond 
her control and involve the charge of grievous bodily harm. Where 
death of the foetus has occurred, the woman has had little opportunity 
for her loss to be recognised in law because the foetus she has been 
carrying has no identity in law and thus the harm is recognised as 
harm to her. These cases have, however, pushed courts to consider the 
impact of medical technologies on how we understand foetal existence 
as well as to recognize and respond to growing community concern 
for the foetus, regarding its purported rights, the question of ‘who’ is 
harmed, the recognition of what is lost when a woman loses her foetus 
in traumatic circumstances, and thus the bigger question of whether 
this entity has rights. 
The born alive rule also comes into play in another significant area 
of law concerning the termination of a pregnancy. The landmark case 
in the US is that of Roe v Wade where the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the foetus does not constitute an entity until it is born alive 
and thus is not entitled to Constitutional protection. Those lobbying 
against legislation which aims to remove or modify the born alive 
criterion, claim that it would undermine reproductive rights of women 
in relation to access to abortion; they also claim that these types of 
legislation potentially place a woman’s right to consent or refuse consent 
to treatment in opposition to perceived rights of the foetus, which has 
certainly been the case in the US. While proposed legislation such as 
the Australian Bill currently excludes medical procedures and ‘anything 
done by, or with the consent of, the pregnant woman concerned’, the 
women’s lobby coalition recognizes that such a position is ‘open to 
interpretation and may not be sufficient to protect the rights of the 
woman involved’ (‘Our Bodies, Our selves: Crimes Amendment Zoe’s 
Law Bill 2013 Factsheet’). Such legal conflict does not currently exist 
in Australia, however it is not difficult to recognise that increasingly in 
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the US, where the born alive rule ‘has been abandoned and the foetus 
is recognised as a legal person, distinct from the mother, [this has led] 
to the policing of pregnancy’ (Uppal et al 2012: 181). 
3 Past Analysis
Past analyses of such cases clearly identify problems arising because, 
while the legal position is clear, an ethical dilemma remains ‘in play’. 
The relationship between law and ethics as it exists regarding cases of 
foetal welfare, is understood in the context of an ‘emerging’ relationship 
between the foetus and the pregnant woman, one where the law has, 
potentially, ethical obligations to both ‘parties’ with developments 
being contingent on ‘the foetus gaining some level of legal status’ 
(Thampapillai 2005: 455).
The interplay between the ethical and legal in cases concerning 
forced obstetrical intervention, as it currently stands in Australia, 
is seen in the UK case of St George’s Healthcare NHS v S, where the 
legal outcome asserts that the pregnant woman’s autonomy takes 
precedence over the interests of the foetus. However, the foetus may be 
considered in the context of the ethical dilemma the pregnant woman 
faces. Consent is thus both an ethical obligation and a legal obligation 
(Werren 2007: 266). This makes clear that discussion of legal cases 
regarding forced obstetrical intervention, and therefore the differences 
between Committee or judiciary positions in different countries, 
centre around ‘their respective approaches to the debate over the 
recognition of “foetal right” which itself creates the concept of “foetal 
abuse/neglect,” or “maternal/foetal conflict”’ (Matevosyan 2013: 511). 
This conceptualization reflects the legal importance of individualistic 
approaches to personhood but fall short in being able to properly capture 
the unique maternal-foetal relationship, its complexities and challenges. 
Seymour (1994a) has characterized the theoretical approaches 
to the maternal-foetal relationship as falling under either single 
entity theory, two entity theory or indivisibly linked entity theory. 
This characterization has been used in further scholarly debate on 
the continuing relevance of the born alive rule in Australia and 
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internationally (for example Savell 2002; 2006a; 2006b; Thampapillai 
2005). The early conceptualization of the foetus as being part of 
the woman’s body, seen as underlying the born alive rule, has been 
understood as a form of single entity theory, that is, that the foetus 
and the pregnant woman are one entity. This approach is identified by 
Seymour as no longer having much force (Seymour 1994a: 35; Seymour 
2002: 36). The single entity approach denies the possibility that the 
foetus has interests, and is generally attacked on the premises that as a 
‘body part’, the foetus is distinct from any other such part – it receives 
support from the mother but plays no role in supporting the life of the 
mother, it has a fixed term existence as a part, and has its own emerging 
body shape and genetic code (Thampapillai 2005: 456).
Conceptualised in seeming opposition to the single entity approach, 
and introducing the potential for an adversarial relationship between 
two parties, is the separate, or two entity approach to defining the status 
of the foetus; this approach distinguishes between the mother and 
the foetus as two separate parties (Seymour 1994a: 29, 2002: 38). The 
conceptualization of two entities, however, and the question of whether 
this best captures the relevant ethical concerns as well as what is legally 
implicated remains fraught.2 Under the proposed Private Members Bill 
in NSW, destruction to the ‘unborn child’ would be recognised and 
thus, Zoe’s Law, as such, draws on a two entity approach to defining 
the essential characteristics of the foetus, distinguishing between the 
personhood of the mother and that of the foetus. This identification 
allows legal recognition of the ethical weight of significant losses to the 
mother/parents; that is, the loss to the mother is of a different nature 
to her losing a body part. In Australia, objection to the proposed Zoe’s 
Law includes its conceptualization of personhood of the foetus, stating 
that this is ‘the first step towards prosecutions of women where they 
are deemed to have acted contrary to the interests of the foetus they 
are carrying’ (‘Our Bodies, Our selves: Crimes Amendment Zoe’s Law 
Bill 2013 Factsheet’). Seymour, however, sees that fear of a slippery 
slope effect, whereby the recognition of the legal status of the foetus 
in one situation will lead to its recognition in another, often leads to 
advocating for a definition of the foetus as a body part (Seymour 2002: 
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39), a view that is now seen as ‘unsustainable’ (Seymour 2002: 39). 
Judicial decisions that emphasise the conceptualization of the 
foetus as ‘a unique organism’, not having the attributes that make it 
a person, but neither being a part of the mother as an arm or a leg 
(Seymour 2002: 31) articulate important intuitions and support the 
identification of the foetus as ‘not a legal person, but … considered 
to be both human and alive, and hence worthy of protection in both 
criminal and civil law’ (Kerridge et al 2013: 559). At the same time, 
the conceptualisation that there is only ‘room for one person with full 
and equal human rights inside a single human skin’ (Warren 1990 cited 
in Burrows 2001) is also important, and centrally so. While the foetus 
may be more than a part of the mother’s body, it is not a person, as we 
conceptualise personhood – especially legally. Analysis of legal cases 
where conceptualization of the foetus is involved makes central such 
intuitions, and there has developed what is referred to as the indivisibly 
linked theory of pregnancy (Seymour 1994a cited in Thampapillai 2005: 
457-458).  Such theory recognizes that there are two sets of interests, but 
rather than pit these as adversarial, it emphasises that ‘interdependence 
means that there is no clear solution to be applied when the rights of 
the foetus and the mother are in conflict’ (Thampapillai 2005: 458). 
Seeing the relationship as one of being indivisibly linked, however, 
‘leaves open the question of how competing rights will be balanced 
against each other’ (Thampapillai 2005: 458). It also allows for the 
conceptualization of the foetus as ‘a unique organism’ not having the 
attributes that make it a person, but neither being a part of the mother 
as an arm or a leg is. 
Savell’s analysis of the Australian cases is pertinent here—she 
supports the view that these two entities be viewed as indivisible because 
‘the ‘connected’ and ‘distinctive’ configurations [of the maternal body] 
both contain plausible elements’ (Savell 2006b: 203). Savell advocates 
for a contextual approach to the maternal body (Savell 2006b: 203-
204), claiming that such an approach can support the born alive rule, 
recognising its enduring significance in law. She sees that retaining 
the born alive rule, despite its seeming outdatedness, ‘is a crucial 
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factor in safeguarding the autonomy of women in decisions concerning 
pregnancy termination and obstetric treatment (Savell 2006b: 205). As 
indivisible entities, legal autonomy of the pregnant woman and thus 
consent can still be clearly identified as the over-riding legal principle.
The continuing play between powerful ethical dilemmas and the 
position of the law has led to errors in legal judgement that have been 
overturned. These legal determinations then point us back to the actions 
of the medical practitioners who encounter the threshold of ethics and 
the law in their practice. While having clear guidelines on their role 
as being to support the woman’s decision-making, some practitioners 
appear to take actions to contest what they see as grey areas of this law, 
driven by a growing perception of the ‘interests’ of the foetus. 
The significance of the ethico-legal nature of the problem is 
particularly emphasised in some of the literature surrounding cases 
in the US. Giving a partial overview of commentary on how case law 
proceeds in the US, Burrows, who sees the concern over the right to 
life of the foetus as an ‘illegal concern’ (Burrows 2001: 690), suggests 
that the practical implementation of the legal principle of informed 
consent is ‘a different matter altogether’ (Burrows 2001: 692) to the 
principle as it is articulated. The legal articulation is often after the 
fact, in an appeal, and in a situation where urgency no longer prevails 
and both parties – the pregnant woman and her medical practitioner 
– have representation and thus support to present their case (Burrows 
2001: 692-693). Burrows suggests that, in practice, ‘ judges use other 
means to enable them to justify the medical intervention’ most typically 
referring to the capacity and competence of the pregnant woman in 
making her health care decisions (Burrows 2001: 692). 
The broader significance of this is that the nature of the ethico-
legal problem is such that the law is not sufficient to prevent some 
medical practitioners and some of the judiciary from finding a way to 
intervene.3   It is also the case that this desire is not necessarily matched 
to the capacity of the profession. Matevosyan identifies that there is 
room for a more advanced reflection on the part of physicians who 
have the discretion to initiate such legal intervention, in particular, 
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regarding their ‘potential impact on the practice of medicine and 
the ability of physicians to maximize foetal health in an aggregate 
population’ (Matevosyan 2013: 526). She quotes the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) as acknowledging that 
‘medical knowledge and predictions of obstetrical outcomes have 
limitations’ (Matevosyan 2013: 511). 
It is also clear from the research that while professional codes 
for medical practitioners clearly identify a medical duty to abide by 
the consent of the pregnant woman, the interdependent relationship 
between the pregnant woman (mother) and the foetus creates ‘confusion 
and tension’ (Kruske et al 2013). While the law and professional 
Codes of practice guide professional behaviour, there is, for some, a 
perceived gap between what the Code of Ethics as a guide to action 
demands and the actions that some practitioners perceive are needed 
in some circumstances.4 Recent research on hospital practices in 
Australia demonstrates that midwives and obstetricians, who are in 
closest contact with the pregnant woman receiving medical care and 
who ‘can significantly influence women’s ability to exercise their legal 
rights’, do not see their situation in relation to the ethico-legal principle 
of autonomy as clearly defined (Kruske et al 2013). The confusion is 
apparent in that while the participants recognised autonomous decision-
making and agreed that the final choice regarding treatment rested with 
the woman, doctors (obstetricians and GPs more so than midwives) 
were more likely to see themselves as being more competent (than the 
pregnant woman) in decision-making about medical care. Overall, the 
study found that ‘maternity care providers have a poor understanding 
of their own legal accountability, and the rights of the woman and 
her foetus’ (Kruske et al 2013). More specifically, the study found the 
following: that doctors (obstetricians and GPs) were more likely than 
midwives to see themselves as being more competent (than the pregnant 
woman) in decision making about medical care; that doctors were more 
likely to see that the needs of the pregnant woman ‘sometimes have to 
be overridden’ and that they were ultimately legally responsible for the 
health of the foetus, even if a collaborative decision-making process 
was undertaken (Kruske et al 2013). 
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It remains the case that in ensuring that the autonomy of the 
pregnant woman is upheld, the health professional’s role is to provide 
her with all the information required to make any hard choices that 
she must make and to support her in these choices. In providing this 
information, the health professional must put aside any subjective 
moral concerns.  Kruske et al’s (2013) research tells us that doing this 
is not that easy and this should be of concern to the law. For Burrows, 
referring to the cases arising in the US, it is quite clear: ‘The dangers of 
health professionals becoming immersed in subjective moral decision 
making cannot be overstated’ (Burrows 2001: 690). 
4 Hospitality and the role of technology in medical 
decision-making
Margaret Shildrick, in looking at how Derrida’s understanding 
of the aporia of justice, and his notion of hospitality as it relates to 
transgressive bodies, focuses on cases of conjoined twins in order to 
tease out how the issues of singularity, duty towards ‘best interests’ and 
medical intervention are viewed in law (Shildrick 2005). While clearly 
differentiated from the cases looked at in this article, and Shildrick 
herself sees cases of pregnancy and the maternal foetal relationship as 
ones where the ‘normalising power of law is sufficient to regularise and 
contain many forms of anomaly’, she also acknowledges that ‘even the 
everyday slippage between mother and foetus inherent in pregnancy 
is sometimes problematic’ (Shildrick 2005: 39). Her use of Derrida’s 
notion of hospitality and justice as a justice ‘to come’ in relation to laws 
that deal with difficulties arising out of cases of anomalous embodiment 
problematising the application of notions of legal individuality are 
relevant here to this extent: she argues that in cases of anomalous 
embodiment, ‘where transgressive corporeality may resist [the law’s] 
disciplinary drive altogether’ this will generally be at the expense of the 
positive value of legal protection (Shildrick 2005: 39).
The embodiment that is pregnancy is not only normal and healthy, 
but at the basis of all humanity. While the foetus is not given a legal 
identity and thus is not afforded the positive value of legal protection, 
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in cases where foetal interests are pitted against maternal rights, the 
drive is to reverse this situation, with the legal protection of maternal 
consent being ‘temporarily suspended’. What is of interest here is that 
while her embodiment is not anomalous in the way that Shildrick takes 
this up, when the foetus is given rights, and we tend towards a sense 
of there being ‘more than one person with full and equal human rights 
inside a single human skin’ (Warren 1990 cited in Burrows 2001), we 
tend towards the conceptualisation of pregnancy as a transgressive 
corporeality. 
While at first glance it is the identification of the foetus in law that 
is most pressing and urgent as perhaps most potentially threatening 
to the pregnant woman’s autonomy, it is the particular practices of 
some members of the medical profession that are also of concern 
here. Actions in this arena focus on the question of what constitutes 
a legitimate response to avoiding a potential harm to the foetus, as an 
individual entity, or patient, with interests, when the potential harm 
could potentially be avoided through medical intervention. While all of 
the facts of a case and its possible outcomes are to be presented to the 
pregnant woman for consideration and her ultimate decision-making, 
the actions of medical practitioners, in initiating legal interventions, 
challenge when the law can override a valid consent. In this initiating 
practitioner’s view, there is a limit to the woman’s autonomy that is 
determined by the situation and interests of the foetus. While this 
is only a perceived limit, it nonetheless drives current questions, 
conceptualisations and debate over foetal ‘interests’ and ‘rights’ rather 
than representing a perspective that might enlarge our understanding 
of pregnant embodiment and underpin support for the woman who 
might have to make a difficult moral choice.
What is important here is the recognition that there are several 
levels of hospitality that become operative when a woman discovers 
herself to be pregnant. In the first instance, culturally, she is seen to 
extend hospitality to her foetus. In recent times, the nature of this 
hosting, the conditions of hospitality that she offers, has come under 
an increasing degree of medical surveillance and ultimately regulation, 
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offered as a medical hospitality. Medical hospitality, through the 
development of new technologies that allow us to see the foetus, is 
now also offered to the foetus, as a patient, through a hospitality that 
is separate and separable from that offered to the mother; a practice 
termed foetal medicine. For medical hospitality to be delivered directly 
to the foetus, the pregnant woman has not only become subject to 
surveillance, but this has progressively become a condition of medical 
hospitality for the mother; a situation which by its being a condition, 
acts to significantly alter her experience of carrying her foetus ‘within 
her own home’ and subject to her own conditions. This impacts her 
particularity, for herself and others. Imagery that results from such 
medical surveillance has encouraged the public to view the foetus as 
what Savell describes as a ‘hope for the limitless future and tragedy 
where his imagined future does not come to pass’ (Savell 2007: 116). 
This imagining has elicited a shift in the way that the public witnesses 
the role of a woman as host to her foetus. 
In extending medical hospitality to the foetus as a welcome 
that recognises the foetus as singular, the particularity of pregnant 
embodiment is rendered as expected, predictable and known; the 
welcome extended to the mother of this foetus is curtailed and she 
is expected to support the conditions of medical hospitality, to not 
disrupt but rather provide the resources for the fraternity of others. 
Her invitation to the medical profession, provided through her consent, 
to participate in her pregnant embodiment is put out of play. In the 
terminology of hospitality, she is rendered as a resource to another’s 
experience of feminine hospitality. 
This requires that we unpack Derrida’s notion of hospitality further, 
recognising that at the very base of the structure is what is termed 
feminine hospitality. Feminine hospitality, Derrida acknowledges, is 
what gives hospitality a patriarchal structure because it is the ‘feminine’ 
that provides the ground upon which the ethical interplay between 
conditional and unconditional hospitality is able to function. The roots 
of the feminine as hospitality are in habituated dwelling – the feeling 
of being at home with oneself that acts to create a feeling of attachment 
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to the home that a host requires in order to claim a space as a home 
from which a welcome can be extended. For Derrida, 
the home is not owned. Or at least it is owned, in a very singular sense 
of this word, only insofar as it is already hospitable to its owner. The 
head of the household, the master of the house, is already … a guest 
in his own home. This absolute precedence of the welcome … would 
be precisely the femininity of ‘Woman’, interiority as femininity – as 
‘feminine alterity’. (Derrida 1999: 42-43)
For the individual, this feminine welcome does not refer explicitly 
to actual women but rather to a feeling or memory, a recollection 
of being unconditionally welcomed within one’s own home – as a 
metaphor for feminine qualities. Yet despite this conceptual rendering 
as metaphorical, Derrida admits that feminine hospitality, in providing 
the ground for others to have time for hosting and the resource base 
for hospitable fraternity, is problematic because although feminine 
hospitality is supposed to be metaphorical, and as such does not refer 
to particular women or even women per se, it conceptually continues 
to work to delimit the possibilities and opportunities for women, and 
as we shall see, pregnant women in particular.   
Understandably then, this aspect of hospitality has been a focus 
of feminist scholarship (in particular see Diprose 2009), the primary 
charge being the capacity of the structures of hospitality to be able 
to include, exclude and/or regulate the public participation of certain 
Others through manipulation of the conditions of hospitality at a state 
level. Those excluded from participation in the social contract, the 
ethical interplay between conditional and unconditional hospitality, 
f ind themselves relegated to tasks of support or nurturing, the 
expectation being that in the absence of their capacity to participate, 
they will support those who can (and should). 
 As we shall clearly see in the ensuing deconstruction, to shift 
the welcome of medical hospitality from the woman to the foetus not 
only relegates the pregnant woman’s embodiment function to that of 
a support, but also denies the woman what is needed for her to have 
her own experience of feminine hospitality in relation to her foetus 
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and her pregnant embodiment. The pregnant woman, especially those 
who may need to negotiate difficult aspects of her pregnancy that call 
for the making of hard decisions, is denied the feeling of familiarity 
and intimacy and the feeling of being at home in her own pregnant 
body. Thus the very conditions she requires to make a hard decision 
are put out of play, by practitioners who have a clear ethical directive 
to provide for this very need.
Technological advances that mediate the stages of pregnancy more 
clearly have also been recognised as important in legal decision-making, 
most particularly in the application of the born alive rule where it is 
recognised that community expectations do not match the discursive 
reasoning of the law. We offer the following deconstruction of an 
example of how, through this technology, the structures of medical 
hospitality frame the manner in which our culture currently responds 
to, and develops expectations around the maternal-foetal relation. 
Our aim is to highlight the concern that these perceptions construct 
a situation whereby the ethics of a conditional medical hospitality 
become related to medical and legal intervention as a practice, rather 
than the ethics of intervention in specific cases. What we discern is that 
the re-situating of the ethical question in such a way as to construct 
intervention as normative and even heroic is achieved through the 
positioning of woman’s pregnant embodiment as belonging to the 
realm of medical feminine hospitality, rather than as a woman who 
not only offers hospitality to her foetus but who also invites medicine 
to participate in this experience. 
In order for the question of justice in the difficult decisions that face 
the medical and legal institutions to do with maternal-foetal conflicts 
to be properly considered, this positioning of the medical profession as 
host to the foetus as patient needs to come into view. For justice to occur, 
as opposed to an application of the law, there needs to be a recognition 
that the maternal welcome is silenced. Subsequently, not only is her 
ability to give a truly informed consent compromised, but so is the 
medical profession’s ability to hear and give due credit to her dissent. 
The particular example we will deconstruct is an image that was 
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labelled ‘the hand of hope’. Here, Samuel, a 21-week-old foetus 
undergoing surgery to treat spina bifida, supposedly reached through 
the uterine incision and ‘grasped’ the surgeon, Dr Bruner’s, finger ‘as 
if in thanks for his life’ (Lymer, 2010: 180). Samuel, the story tells, 
was subsequently born ‘normal’, rescued from a difficult life by Dr 
Bruner (Davis, 1999 – see Figure 1).5
Figure 1: The Hand of Hope
Catherine Mills has argued that ‘taking the possibility of a ‘visual 
bioethics’ seriously requires that more attention is paid to the emotive 
or affective impact of images on ethical intuitions’ (Mills 2008: 61). 
Mills identifies that it is the ‘affective or emotive force of ultrasound 
images that make them crucial in … debate’ (Mills 2008: 62). Images 
such as this one, that show a single particular foetus, have circulated 
within our culture since Lennart Nilsson’s 1966 iconic image on the 
cover of Life magazine of a foetus floating in vacant space. The twelve-
week old foetus floating in space not only exists as a separate being, 
and thus separable, from the maternal body but the replacement of 
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the woman’s body with vacant space extends an invitation to man, to 
medicine, to ‘discover’, to explore and perhaps even to conquer. It is no 
mistake that when this image first appeared in a 1966 edition of Life 
magazine it was surrounded by nationalist photographs and articles 
showing the space ship Gemini, a helicopter-gunship over Vietnam 
and Frank Sinatra (Lymer 2010: 180). Barbara Duden describes the 
image as a ‘haunting symbol of loneliness’ (Duden 1993: 7); small, 
vulnerable and alone, this foetus appears also as either abandoned or 
even as hostage when applied to cases of maternal dissent. 
The image of the disembodied foetus has, through its circulation, 
allowed us to not only express the possibility of foetal subjectivity, and 
thus as having ‘interests’, but also frames debates surrounding foetal 
rights and maternal duties of care which act to persuade the public. 
Mills, in arguing for the ‘polemical force of … imaging technologies’ 
as being ‘in the emotive effect that seeing the foetus induces’, cites Julia 
Black, the documentary film-maker of My Foetus, a controversial film 
on abortion, as suggesting that ‘if anything is to lead her to take an 
anti-abortion position, it is this capacity to see the foetus, particularly 
as it is performing activities normally associated with babies, such as 
thumb sucking’ (Mills 2005: 427). In the case of abortion, the emotive 
effect leads to the conclusion that abortion is immoral (Mills 2005: 
427). Following this, in cases where foetal interests are pitched as in 
opposition to maternal rights, the emotive effect is that any dissent from 
supporting these interests is construed as immoral. Savell has extended 
analysis in relation to the birth of 4D foetal ultrasound techniques 
observing ‘that this technology has ‘democratised’ foetal images by 
rendering them more accessible to the public’ and in doing so creates 
hope for the future for this foetus in the eyes of the public and constructs 
the narrative that not attaining this future represents a tragedy (Savell 
2007: 116). The political possibilities of this democratisation will 
become evident shortly. 
The ‘hand of hope’ imagery further extends the threshold of what 
has become a normative foetal image. Firstly, by extending the available 
surgical options to non-lethal foetal malformations, in this case spina 
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bifida, the foetus is accorded ‘an even more robust moral status as a 
bona fide patient for whom there is a separate set of risks and benefits 
distinguishable from those of the mother’ (Lymer, 2010: 180, see also 
Fleischman et al 1998 for a similar argument). Surgeries such as these 
are on the increase and so mothers become at least morally obliged 
to consider them as options despite the risk to her health and even 
though the procedures are still considered experimental. Yet the image 
and narrative are devoid of the pregnant woman’s name and face, her 
pregnant body reduced to primarily a severed uterus, and then some 
flesh that seems indistinguishable from the operating table. Although 
it is Samuel’s mother who has borne the risks and consequences of 
this medical intervention, indeed it is her hospitality that welcomes 
them in, it is Samuel and Dr Bruner who are named as having a 
special intersubjective fraternity, extending a medical hospitality that 
is presented to the world. The mother’s hospitality on the other hand 
is silent and compliant. She is reduced to her body; to that which will 
resource the medical hospitality that Dr Bruner offers this foetus and 
because of the lack of evident maternal subjectivity, we are not ethically 
drawn to have concern for her. Rather, it is Samuel who represents our 
hopes and the imagined future. 
This image went viral on the internet, exposing the severed and 
opened uterus as the image of ‘mother’ to the world. Hospitably 
positioned as she is within the generic of feminine being, the cultural 
expectation is that she will act as resource to the medical hospitality 
being offered her foetus and so the image captures her bodily acceptance 
of this procedure as a moral proclamation of ‘good’ because Samuel 
was born ‘normal’. She has put aside her voice, as so many women 
would do in this situation, and will remain compliant throughout 
this process – quite literally anaesthetised. What is most important 
to discern here is the way in which the structures of hospitality as 
medical hospitality both condition and demand maternal compliance 
through the moralising role that this sort of imagery preaches. Within 
the structures of hospitality, acknowledging foetal singularity depends 
upon the generalisation of the maternal body and the universalising of 
maternal experience into a conceptualising framework that medicine 
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(still a male dominated institution) authoritatively comprehends. 
However, Samuel is a socially constructed image of a patient, what 
Derrida (2002: 3) terms an ‘artifactuality’ – a ‘fictional fashioning’ that 
is performativity selective, and edited –  a rendering.6  Not only is 
Samuel not at this stage a person he is also not viable and so his life 
depends much more upon his mother than on Dr Bruner. What our 
emotive responses overlook is the propaganda; the maternal-foetal 
relation portrayed is neither reasonable nor factual. In the above image, 
this foetus is at 21 weeks gestation, and so although the neural 
connections between the spinal cord and the thalamus are usually 
completed by 20 weeks, it is not until 24-26 weeks that thalamocortical 
connections will have grown into the cortex (Anand & Hickey 1987: 
1322). As such, ‘Samuel’ is not a conscious being, he is not a subject that 
can engage in intersubjective relationships; his cortex is ‘not a functional 
unit’ (Fitzgerald 1994: 153); he was also apparently anaesthetised at 
the time. Thus, the seemingly grasping hand is a form of rhetorical 
play, an act of persuasion to an ultimately sentimental sociality. We 
should then not be surprised to find that Samuel’s story was cited 
during congressional debates on the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 
which passed in the US in 2000. Today, a Google search using the term 
‘hand of hope’ returns over one and a half million results, including a 
follow up story of Samuel by FoxNews 10 years after the photograph 
went viral where he advocates the right to life of disabled foetuses. A 
Wikipedia entry links to the photographs and the announcement of 
the Hand of Hope clinic in Georgia – all on the first page. 
The manner in which this kind of imagery presents the privacy 
of a pregnant woman’s internal body as a universal and generalizable 
public space, and the absence of her subjectivity from the imagery and 
thus from the position of a singularity whose particular embodied 
experience warrants consideration, denies her welcome. The result is 
a representation of pregnant embodiment that at once universalises 
pregnant experience, generalising particular women’s experience 
of pregnancy and opening these to public discourse, scrutiny and 
ultimately leaving them vulnerable to coercive and regulating moral 
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judgement, which, as Kruske et al (2013) have shown, the Codes of 
medical practice are not sufficient to hold off.
5 Conclusion
Derrida describes justice as the experience of a state of suspension 
and indeterminacy; as an event that opens itself to the impossibility 
that experience can be reduced to institutional law. It is the recognition 
that justice is not the result of such a reduction that opens up the 
possibility for a transformation of law and yet this transformation does 
not necessitate an absolute rejection of the existing order. Rather, it 
is a recognition that unmasks, exposes, and ultimately gives ethical 
regard to the violence and lawlessness of its origins. As Derrida says: 
‘There is an avenir for justice and there is no justice except to the degree 
that some event is possible which, as event, exceeds calculation, rules, 
programs, anticipations and so forth’ (Derrida 2010: 257). 
For the pregnant women who invites medical care and receives 
medical hospitality, the avenir of justice is not indefinitely deferred as 
it is pregnant embodiment that must be suspended and becomes the 
vehicle through which what is possible comes into being. In cases of 
contested rights, it is only through pregnant embodiment that foetal 
rights are possible and so their inscription instigates a disruption to 
the maternal body, from its own sense of feminine hospitality which is 
then appropriated to support medical hospitality and its authoritative 
rendering of the foetus as patriarchal citizen. 
The legitimacy of this avoidance of the ethical is, of course, 
highly ethically questionable, especially in the hard cases that we 
have described above, and this is evidenced by the controversy that 
currently surrounds the concept of foetal rights. In most of these cases, 
the campaigns ask, demonstrate and continue to challenge the legal 
profession to hear and respond to the welcome that gestation embodies 
as a concrete and particular embodiment that cannot be reduced. We 
would hope that these challenges are met with some success.
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Notes
1  Healthy adults are generally presumed to be competent in regard 
to decision making within both the medical and legal professions 
and so the issue is usually raised only in cases where a condition 
will generate a temporary lack of competency or in cases where a 
recommended treatment has been refused. Assessment of capacity 
in law requires the patient to clearly understand the nature of the 
proposed treatment and the consequences of refusal (Meredith 2005: 
123). McLean (2010) argues that that this test of competence leaves 
pregnant, and particularly labouring women, whose ‘condition’ 
can be read within a paternalistic and historical environment as 
compromised,  vulnerable to being deemed incompetent on the 
basis that they disagree with medical recommendations. While this 
investigation is relevant to the argument that we articulate here, 
we will not pursue this matter further primarily due to word count 
restrictions, and also because the cultural treatment of women per 
se as emotional and lacking a capacity for proper moral judgement 
is deeply related to the position they hold within the structures of 
hospitality (see for example, Diprose 2009).
2 Under the proposed Private Members Bill in NSW, destruction to 
the ‘unborn child’ would be recognised. Zoe’s Law, as such, draws 
on a two-entity approach to defining the essential characteristics of 
the foetus, distinguishing between the personhood of the mother 
and that of the foetus. This Bill includes an identification of the 
foetus as being more than a body part for the purpose of cases where 
the foetus is harmed or, after being born, dies due to actions of 
third parties, and thus refers to cases of actual harm, or death, these 
being identified as either negligent or criminal. This identification 
allows legal recognition of the ethical weight of significant losses to 
the mother/parents; that is, the loss to the mother is of a different 
nature to her losing a body part. It must be noted here however, 
that legally recognising significant losses, other than those of losing 
a body part, to legally recognised persons differs however from 
articulating legal entities whose perceived interests are in fact the 
interests as construed by and through the social institutions and the 
state. This Bill excludes medical procedures and ‘anything done by, 
or with the consent of, the pregnant woman concerned’, however, 
advocates state that this clause remains ‘open to interpretation and 
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may not be sufficient to protect the rights of the woman involved’ 
(‘Our Bodies, Our selves: Crimes Amendment Zoe’s Law Bill 2013 
Factsheet’).
3 This is supported by Burrows with reference to a range of US cases.
4 This finding reflects the reality that actions by the profession are 
always those of an already interested party, that is, one party with 
interests in relation to another party whose perceived interests 
are viewed through the interests of the first. This reality, that 
personal moral judgements might interfere with treatment and the 
practitioner needs to be aware of such instances, is recognized in 
both the AMA Code of Ethics and the AMA Position Statement 
on Maternal Decision Making that supports the thrust of the Code 
of Ethics in sustaining maternal consent as the boundary. Section 
1.1 of the AMA Code of Ethics on Patient Care, Point 16, states: 
‘When a personal moral judgment or religious belief alone prevents 
you from recommending some form of therapy, inform your patient 
so that they may seek care elsewhere’ (AMA Code of Ethics: 
https://ama.com.au/codeofethics). In the Position Statement, and 
following quite lengthy description of the sorts of circumstances 
where the interests of the foetus and the mother may diverge, and 
how this may cause significant distress for the doctor and challenge 
the doctor’s viewpoint, Point 9 is as follows: 
The doctor must respect the woman’s informed decision, even if it is 
not consistent with the doctor’s advice, and continue to provide patient 
support. In the event that the doctor cannot in good faith continue 
to care for the patient, they have a duty to make timely arrangements 
for that patient’s ongoing care. (AMA 2013) 
 While the law, the Code of Ethics and the Professional Body’s Position 
Statement are all quite clear with regards to practices that need to be 
followed in order that the professional remain within the law at all times 
– that is, remains accountable to her institutional practice--this remains an 
area of confusion, even in Australia, where no cases of forced obstetrical 
intervention have occurred. 
5 There has ensued a media debate surrounding the possibility of 
Samuel actually doing this as he was supposedly anesthetised at the 
time. Also, while the narrative declares the surgery a success and 
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Samuel to be born ‘normal’, a follow up of the case 10 years later 
by FoxNews reveals that Samuel cannot walk without leg braces 
and is very often wheelchair bound. He also has a three year old 
brother with spina bifida.
6 Both ‘patients’ and ‘interests’ are mediated by parties within 
these institutions who themselves have ‘interests’. Actions by the 
profession are always those of an already interested party, that is, one 
party with interests in relation to another party who has interests. 
Featherstone argues that this interest developed not only from 
medical technologies but, and especially in Australia, around ‘social, 
political and economic discourses stressing the need for population 
growth’ (Featherstone 2008: 454). At the end of the 19th century 
and the beginning of the 20th Century science and medicine were 
taking more interest in the life of the foetus, stimulated in part 
by the earlier discoveries of the human egg and the mechanics of 
fertilization (Featherstone 2008: 453). The foetus was a potential 
child, and as such there developed a morality and legality around its 
presence. Significantly, as the foetus became not only conceptually 
and linguistically present, but, eventually visible, with such visions 
‘mediated, even distorted, through the lens of culture, but were 
nonetheless naturalized and seemingly made coherent’ (Hartouni 
cited in Featherstone 2008: 459). At the same time, ‘the mother’s 
bodily autonomy [was] undermined. She became the “host”, an 
invisibilised  “backdrop”, while the foetus has moved from being 
a “passenger” to becom[ing] the active player’ (Franklin cited in 
Featherstone 2008: 459).
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